This article is devoted to the legitimation and application of the standards of ex post and ex ante by courts and the executive authorities in the sphere of competition regulation. The postulates of ex post and ex ante are considered as legal principles. The principle of ex post is intended solely for judicial and administrative application; it has a deontological framework; it assumes that the legality of the activity of economic entities is assessed only on the basis of positive legal criteria in terms of the subjective rights violated; it is limited to a particular case. The traditional approach to the principle of ex post limits the scope of its application on the subjects and excessively expands its objects. The postulate of ex ante has a utilitarian basis which assumes the assessment of the application of relevant rules in the future. One of the main aims of the article is to refute the common view of lawyers and economists that a legislator applies principle of ex ante not being bound by principle of ex post, while it is the other way around for the courts and the executive authorities. The principle of ex ante may be applied not only in the process of the creation of new rules but also at the application stage for existing rules on economic competition. This is justified because the arguments of the courts and the executive authorities about a refusal to take into account the consequences of a decision in a particular case are not convincing.
1.Introduction
Federal Law of 26.07.2006 № 135-FZ "On the Protection of Competition" combines two contradictory trends based on the principles of ex post and ex ante. The existing contradiction affects the entire practice and implementation of national competition law. This article highlights the constitutional and legal legitimation of these two principles and their application to competition regulation by the courts and executive authorities. One of the aims of this paper is to refute the common view of lawyers and economists that a legislator applies principle of ex ante being not bound by principle of ex post, while it is the other way around for the courts and the executive authorities. In this article, principles of ex post and ex ante are considered as legal principles, not only as methodological approaches.
2.The principle of ex post
Two major criteria associated with the subjects of application and evaluation standards can be used to distinguish between the principles of ex post and ex ante. Therefore, in terms of legal and economic doctrines, the principle of ex post has the following characteristics. It is intended solely for judicial and administrative application; it has a deontological framework; it assumes that the legality of the activity of an economic entity is assessed only on the basis of positive legal criteria in terms of the subjective rights violated; it is limited to a particular case in contrast to the economic analysis associated with the actual effects 4 . At the same time, it is assumed that the legal consequences and conditions of their occurrence are unequivocally defined by the law which provides the basis for the emergence and protection of subjective rights. Proponents of the traditional interpretation of the ex post criterion believe that it allows the automatic application of the original norm on the basis of logical deduction by the competent authorities 5 . Following this approach, any adjustments of the law are possible only at the level of the legislator because the legislator provides legal policy, and the courts should apply only legal rules and principles 6 . By virtue of this approach, the courts are not responsible for the consequences of the implementation of legal provisions, defining the mere fact of their violation 4 See Becker G. and the content of subjective rights but not the actual consequences of the decision taken for the parties of the dispute and for the whole society.
Some arguments lying at the heart of the doctrinal approach to the principle of ex post are 1) its validity in terms of the existing legal framework; 2) the rejection of retroactivity, i.e. the rejection of the ascription of legal obligation appearing after the beginning of the dispute to participants, 7 "…it is unfair for the losing party to suffer because of fresh policy determination"; 8 3) the minimization of risk for legal stability and the principle of equality; 4) the exclusion of illegal reasons from the legal reasoning; 5) the establishment of the priority of rights of economic entities over the objectives of government economic policy.
Let us analyse the first two of these arguments which are considered to be the most 13 .
In In our opinion, the traditional approach to the principle of ex post has two significant drawbacks. Firstly, it unduly limits the scope of its application to the subjects. And, secondly, it excessively expands its objects. What kind of arguments could be put forward against this approach? First of all, the Constitutional Court often applies the principle of ex post not only for the analysis of current legal practice but also for assessing the constitutionality of federal laws. 
3.The principle of ex ante as a tool of the legislator

4.The principle of ex ante as a tool of the courts and the executive authorities
This standard may be applied, however, not only in the process of the creation of new rules but also at the application stage for existing rules on economic competition. This is justified because arguments of the courts about the refusal take into account the consequences of a decision in a particular case are not convincing. In this regard, it is necessary to distinguish between four types of the consequences, namely, 1) the negative consequences of wrongful acts 
5.Conclusion
The problem of the legitimation of the principle of ex ante is the problem of its place entities and allows the arbitration courts to apply a special measure of the state response, i.e. the court's refusal to protect the subjective rights (paragraph 2 of Article 10 of the Civil Code).
In addition to a weak legitimate foundation, the principle of ex ante has a number of serious substantive flaws that need to be taken into account by the courts and executive authorities. One of these shortcomings is the neutrality of the principle of ex ante in relation to the beneficial social group of the regulatory action and in relation to the question who would bear the costs of such regulation. This neutrality is observed because it is enough for the implementation of the principle of ex ante to have a positive overall balance by comparing all the costs and benefits of economic regulation. For competition law, however, question about the results of the implementation of the beneficiary rules is essential. For example, European competition law is aimed towards the protection of the interests of consumers 27 .
